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to the students, the students may perceive these rules as oppressive.
Therefore, the rules implement social preferences, not social absolutes,
and should not be under the control of the boards. Furthermore, the
restrictions on extracurricular activities, by definition, apply to students
already married and still in school. The Davis and Holt courts recog-
nized this paradox of punishing students after the fact of marriage but
questioned the means, not the ends, of the rules. Therefore, an alterna-
tive view of the function of schools in the socialization of students is
that the boards of education should implement only those social values
that directly affect the welfare of society and will prepare the student to
function in society.
Lastly, it is submitted that a more humane and useful approach
to the problem of teenage marriage may be for the schools to create
programs that will educate all students on the responsibilities of mar-
riage. This approach will not only attack the problem more directly
and efficiently but will also provide future guidance to the students
when they finally leave school.
CARL R. REYNOLDS
CRIMINAL LAW-FACULTY MEMBER ENTERING SCHOOL BUILDING
DURING TEACHERS STRIKE FOUND GUILTY OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND
RESISTING ARREST.
During the middle of October, 1968, New York City was in the
grips of its third teachers' strike in a month. Staged by the United
Federation of Teachers (UFT), this strike, which was later declared
illegal,' kept more than a million children out of public schools for
over a month. Like the two preceding walkouts, it was basically a re-
sult of the city's attempt to decentralize its schools. The city had made
several moves to set up experimental "demonstration" districts in
which a decentralization plan could be tested under set guidelines.
During this period deep and angry splits began developing among
whites, blacks, and Puerto Ricans over such issues as hiring, firing,
transferring, teacher accountability, minority principals, and expul-
sion of students. Frustrated by the state legislature's failing to back
1. See Rankin v. Shanker, 25 N.Y.2d 780, 250 N.E.2d 584, 303 N.Y.S.2d 527
(1969). For two versions of the events in New York City during this time, see B. CARTER,
PICKETS, PARENTS AND POWER (1971); M. MAYER, THE TEACHERS STRIKE (1969).
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decentralization, the city proposed an "interim" plan which allowed
local boards to transfer teachers. In response, the UFT, which wanted
to gain control over teacher transfers, struck for two days. The union
walked out again when the "demonstration board" at the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville district defied an order of the New York City Board of
Education and refused to take back teachers it had relieved from duty.
A scant few days after the settlement of this second strike, the teachers
were again relieved. The city responded by removing the "demonstra-
tion board," three "demonstration principals," and the district super-
intendent, in effect dosing down Ocean Hill. When the board of edu-
cation attempted to return the three principals and reopen the school
district, the UFT struck for the third time.
As the strike progressed, it gained sympathy from many 'of the
city's principals and custodians, several of whom began dosing and
locking their own schools. However, not all of the city's public school
teachers joined the UFT action. In an attempt to avoid the strike's
paralyzing effect and to reassert its own authority, the board of educa-
tion publicly announced on October 16, that the schools would remain
open as long as there were teachers willing to teach. It was hoped
that public announcement of this policy would cause recalcitrant prin-
cipals and custodians to acquiesce and open their schools to those
teachers responding to the board's invitation. Failing in this, the board
was preparing an alternate procedure for opening and operating the
schools under designated teachers-in-charge, many of whom had al-
ready been chosen.
On October 17, in apparent response to the board's announcement,
appellant Horelick reported to Washington Irving High School, which
had been closed by its principal. Accompanying Horelick were some
fellow teachers, one of whom was the designated teacher-in-charge, and
who carried a letter of authority from his district superintendent. Out-
side the school's front doors the group was confronted by members of
the custodial staff, while other custodians inside began nailing windows
shut. Although precisely what followed was clouded by conflicting
recollections, it is agreed that after being thwarted in his first effort
to enter the school, Horelick ultimately gained entry through an un-
secured window. As the appellant proceeded through a hallway toward
some side doors, he was intercepted by a custodian who attempted to
stop him. Continuing toward the doors, Horelick was, halted by a
policeman responding to the warning cries of the custodian and was
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arrested for trespass. It was also alleged that Horelick resisted arrest
by attempting to kick and squirm away from the arresting officer. On
the night of October 19 Horelick was again arrested for trespass when
he refused to leave the school following the performance of a public
concert. Horelick's conviction on two counts of criminal trespass in
the second degree 2 and one count of resisting arrest8 was affirmed by
the appellate division. Upon appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
held: Horelick did not have the right to use self-help to enter the school
and additional force to prevent his arrest. Whether the school was
properly closed or not, Horelick's available remedy was to seek the
assistance of his superiors. People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453, 285
N.E.2d 864, 334 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1972).
To resolve this case, the majority placed emphasis on the notions
of forcible entry and detainer, and of breaking and entering. Criminal
liability for forcible entry or detainer has typically been imposed by
the courts only where it could be shown that there was actual threat-
ened violence tending towards a breach of the peace or an abuse of
authority.4 Fults v. Munro,5 the leading New York case in this area,
held that forcible entry implies a different kind of force from that
which is involved in a mere trespass. This force must be
unusual and tend to bring about a breach of the peace, such as entry
with a strong hand, or a multitude of people, or in a riotous manner,
or with personal violence, or with threat and menace to life and limb,
or under circumstances which would naturally inspire fear and lead
one to apprehend danger of personal injury if he stood up in defense
of his possession."
The law relating to "breaking," on the other hand, holds generally
that the sort of force just described is not required to be shown. Thus,
for example, the mere effort necessary to effect an entry through an
unlocked, or even slightly ajar, door or window would be enough to
constitute "breaking."7 The concept of "breaking" also includes entry
by a threat or ploy used for that purpose or by connivance with some-
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1967).
3. Id. § 205.30.
4. Brandt v. Kosenko, 57 Misc. 2d 574, 293 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. 1968);
Pollack v. Macombs Inwood Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 563, 276 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Civ. Ct. 1966);
Pisano v. Nassau County, 41 Misc. 2d 844, 246 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1963), afl'd,
21 App. Div. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 22 (2d Dep't 1964).
5. 202 N.Y. 34, 95 N.E. 23 (1911).
6. Id. at 42, 95 N.E. at 26.
7. See People v. Viola, 264 App. Div. 38, 34 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (3d Dep't 1942).
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one inside, or any other violation of an occupant's security against in-
trusion.8 Simple trespass, then, could not per se give rise to an action
for damages under forcible entry and detainer.
A mere trespass unaccompanied by any circumstances of actual
violence or terror is not such a forcible entry as will authorize the main-
tenance of a forcible entry and detainer proceeding. . . . So, too,
merely breaking or wrenching off a lock prior to entry will not in
and of itself constitute a forcible entry, unless such acts are accom-
panied by violence or a riotous entry."
With the adoption in 1967 of section 140.10--criminal trespass in
the second degree' 0-the traditionally confusing concept of "breaking"
was dropped from the Penal Law. This statute provides that "[a]
person is guilty of criminal trespass ... when he knowingly enters or re-
mains unlawfully in a building .... ,"1 Although the mens rea require-
ment is narrowed to a specific unlawful intent,'2 the presence of actual
criminal intent is not essential to a conviction under section 140.10.13
The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an ac-
cused actually knew of the illegality of his conduct. Honest belief that
one is licensed or privileged to enter or remain is a defense to an action
brought under this section. The absence of such license or privilege
must be proved by the people, for this is not an offense of strict liabil-
ity.14 Naturally a person gaining entry "through intimidation or by
deception, trick or artifice, does not enter with 'license or privilege.' "15
Where a person enters or remains in a public building, he cannot
knowingly violate the statute until directly informed of the illegality
of his presence. Since Washington Irving High School is not a public
building in the sense that the public may enter or remain at will, an
order to leave the school is not a critical element in Horelick's case. 16
The second issue in this case was Horelick's right to resist arrest.
8. See Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00(McKinney 1967).
9. 14 CARMODY-WAIT 2d, What is forcible entry and detainer § 90:126 (1967).
10. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1967).
11. Id.
12. In re C., 66 Misc. 2d 907, 323 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Faro. Ct. 1971).
13. See In re D., 58 Misc. 2d 1093, 296 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Faro. Ct. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 33 App. Div. 2d 1028, 308 N.Y.S.2d 262 (2d Dep't 1970); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 140.00(5) (McKinney 1967); Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary to id.
at 340.
14. Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05 at
347 (McKinney 1967).
15. Denzer & McQuillan, supra note 13, at 341.
16. See In re C., 66 Misc. 2d 907, 323 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Fain. Ct. 1971).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The long-standing notion that, under proper circumstances, one may
lawfully resist an arrest has been severely restricted in New York dur-
ing the past decade. Prior to July 1, 1963, a police officer could not
make an authorized warrantless arrest unless it involved a felony or a
crime committed or attempted in his presence.17 Resisting arrest was
permissible when the above conditions were not met. A defendant
actually could use reasonable force to resist arrest, and if found not
guilty of the crime for which he was arrested could not be convicted
of resisting arrest.
This practice met its demise shortly after People v. Dreares,18 a
case in which a defendant who had injured a policeman was neverthe-
less acquitted of resisting arrest. The New York Legislature amended
section 177 (1) of the former Code of Criminal Procedure to allow a
policeman to make an authorized arrest without a warrant when it was
reasonable to believe that a crime was being committed in his pres-
ence.1 9 In addition, section 35.27, recently added to the New York
Penal Law, forbids the use of "physical force to resist an arrest, whether
authorized or unauthorized, which is being effected or attempted by a
peace officer when it would reasonably appear that the latter is a police
officer."'20 And under section 205.30,21 entitled "Resisting arrest," it is
no longer necessary that a defendant use violence or force in obstruct-
ing the arresting officer. All that is needed is proof that an accused en-
gaged in some kind of conduct, including most forms of passive resist-
ance, with the intent to prevent the officer from effecting an authorized
arrest.22 In view of this recent legislation, at present, the fact that a
defendant is subsequently acquitted of the underlying charge does not
prevent him from being convicted of resisting his arrest on that charge.
The true import of these provisions may be found in section 140.10 of
the Criminal Procedure Law23 (which replaced section 177 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure). This statute eliminates the vague, gen-
eral use of the term "peace officer" by distinguishing between police
officers and non-police peace officers; it permits arrests for misde-
meanors and felonies to be made on the same basis by expanding the
jurisdiction of the officers; and it provides that the crime need no longer
17. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 504, § 177.
.18. 11 N.Y.2d 906, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1962).
19. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 580 (repealed 1971).
'20. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
21. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 1967).
22. Id.
23. N.Y. Ca m. PRo. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1971).
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be committed in the officer's presence.24 The combined effect of these
statutes is that the chances of lawfully resisting arrest are practically
nonexistent in New York.25 The underlying philosophy of what is
termed "no-sock" is that altercation and injury tend to be promoted if
the validity of an arrest is permitted to be disputed on the spot. The
preferred procedure, then, is for the suspect to offer an immediate
and orderly submission to the arresting officer, and later seek remedial
action in the courts if he feels he has been wronged. The "no-sock"
principle, however, is not designed to prevent someone from lawfully
resisting an unjustified beating or an excessive use of force by police.26
'New York's predilection for peaceful solutions wherever possible
has rendered the concept of "self-help" obsolete. Apparently, the think-
ing is that: (1) "self-help" is unnecessary since legal remedies are avail-
able and adequate for most situations; (2) "self-help," or a forceful as-
sertion of one's rights, tends toward violence, breaches of the peace,
and general danger to the urbanized society; and (3) "self-help" inter-
feres with the orderly functions of the legal system and of law enforce-
ment officers.
The court in the instant case rejected a consideration of whether
the school was lawfully closed on several grounds. First, the decision
of *the principal and the complicity of the custodians in closing the
school were said to be "reviewable elsewhere. '2 7 Second, it was said
that whether or not the board directed the schools to remain open,
the principal, by virtue of being in direct charge of his school, has the
"power... to direct the school to be open or closed. Safety of students
and teachers requires no less authority."2 8 Third, the court stated that
there existed a procedure for opening schools that had been closed im-
properly, which the appellant failed to follow.
Manipulating its analysis in the above ways, the court was able
to state the issue as follows:
[It] is not the lawfulness of the closing of the school . . . but the
use of s elfzhelp to enter the school and then additional force to pre-
24. See Denzer, Practice Commentary to id. at 463-64.
25. For an eloquent argument against the New York position, see Chevigny, The
Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128 (1969).
,, 26. People v. Sanza, 37 App. Div. 2d 632, 323 N.Y.S.2d 632 (2d Dep't 1971).
'.,27. People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453, 457, 285 N.E. 2d 864, 866, 334 N.Y.S.2d
623, 625 (1972) [Hereinafter cited as instant case].
"28. Id. at 456, 285 N.E.2d at 865, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25. The majority
supports this conclusion on the school by-laws, parts of which may be found in Brief
for Respondent at Addendum 4, instant case.
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vent arrest .... T]he issue is whether the resort to self-help by
"breaking and entering" in the classic sense, is permitted, an issue
laid to rest long ago by successive and ancient statutes relating to
forcible entry and detainer....s
Because the school was closed, the court reasoned that Horelick's
conduct was to be judged not by whether he had a right or duty to be
in the school, but by whether he was licensed or privileged to enter the
school furtively and with force in order to open it. The court con-
cluded that with the police and custodians at the doors of a closed
school, the only way that Horelick could secure entry was by the use
of force or some other illegal means. Even Horelick's superiors would
not have been permitted to do this, for it would ultimately prompt
counterforce, and "it is not tolerable that the controversies be resolved
in the streets or the school corridors, instead of under law, and in the
courts, if necessary."30
On the charge of resisting arrest, the majority accepted the lower
court's finding that Horelick resisted his arrest by trying to kick a
policeman.
The dissent regarded the lawfulness of the school principal's ac-
tion as a vital issue in this case.31 It felt that despite the exigency of
the general situation, the board's published directive overruled the
principal's authority to respond speedily to any safety threat. The
board exercised its superior custody and control by virtue of its ultimate
legal authority over all the school property,8 2 as opposed to that au-
thority of the principal which is derived from the school by-laws. It
was this directive which reaffirmed Horelick's right and duty to be in
the school, regardless of the illegal strike. That Horelick entered as he
did was "not remarkable in the light of the hostility of custodians who
were wrongfully closing the school."' Hence, it was "not established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 'wrongfully' in the
school," 34 on either occasion for which he was charged. The mens rea
necessary under section 140.10 was not proved in this case since Hore-
29. Instant case at 456, 285 N.E.2d at 865, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
30. Id. at 458, 285 N.E.2d at 866, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
31. Id. at 459, 285 N.E.2d at 867, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 627 (dissenting opinion).
32. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2550, 2552, 2554(2), (4) (McKinney 1969). Section
2554(4) empowers the board to directly oversee the care, custody, control and safe-
keeping of all school property not specifically placed by law under control of some other
body or officer and to prescribe rules and regulations for preservation of such property.




lick's colorable claim of right, even if mistaken, is a valid defense, 35
which the prosecution failed to overcome.
The dissent dismisses the charge of resisting arrest by asserting
that Horelick's movements did "not actually establish the defendant's
guilt for attempting to 'prevent' the officer from 'effecting' "3 his ar-
rest, let alone serve as "a fair basis for a separate prosecution on a dis-
tinct crime."3 7
The most unsettling feature of the majority opinion is its failure
to analyze this case within the bounds of the crimes for which Horelick
was charged. If the Penal Law is to be our guide, the question is not
whether the defendant "broke in," or "entered forcibly," but whether
he knowingly entered the school unlawfully. This is a difficult ques-
tion-one which deserves more attention than the majority allowed.
An analysis of the majority's technique of avoiding this question
shows that the court's conclusion-that "it is not tolerable that the
controversies be resolved in the streets or the school corridors, instead
of under law, and in the courts, if necessary" 38-- was actually the
premise for its interpretation of the facts. The majority clearly was
unable to use criminal trespass as the vehicle for its reasoning since
the essence of criminal trespass is not whether Horelick's acts were
proper, but rather, what he believed (or knew) while he was acting.
Thus, in its recital of the facts the majority was constrained to depict a
scene resembling that of forcible entry 9 in order to rationalize its dis-
taste for self-help. The confrontation was determined by the court to
be "emotional and incipiently riotous,"40 facts helpful toward proving
forcible entry, but not even alleged by the prosecution.41 The issue was
not deemed to be whether the school was lawfully closed, but whether
Horelick was permitted to use "self-help to enter the school and then
additional force to prevent arrest. '"42 Phrasing the issue this way im-
plies that Horelick used "force" to effect his entry; the court seemed
to treat the "force" used in Horelick's subsequent physical struggles
with his captors as indications of the "force" he must have used to
35. Id. See Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary to N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 140.05 at 347 (McKinney 1967) and text at notes 12-15, supra.
36. Instant case at 461, 285 N.E.2d at 868, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 628 (dissenting
opinion).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 458, 285 N.E.2d at 866, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
39. See text at note 7 supra.
40. Instant case at 455, 285 N.E.2d at 865, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
41. Brief for Respondent at 2, 16-19, instant case.
42. Instant case at 456, 285 N.E.2d at 865, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
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enter the building. Again, even the prosecution did not allege this,
but handled the entry and the resisting arrest as two totally separate
occurrences.43 This "force" that the court attributed to Horelick's
entry was, of course, another factor helpful in building a showing of
forcible entry. Ironically, the mere act of opening a window normally
would fit into the classical concept of "breaking" or "mere trespass,"
not forcible entry. The court's conclusion again indicates a tendency to
overstate the situation: "Since only force or some other illegal method
could be used to effect an entry which would inevitably provoke
counter-force (in this case, even riot), the remedy to open the school
'..,,4 lay elsewhere. There is no indication, in this case, of any counter-
force--certainly not that which was "inevitable" or which would be of
"riot" proportions. In the passage quoted above there also seems to
be the assumption that force is illegal. It is apparent that the majority
presupposes the facts necessary to arrive at the desired result-that
Horelick gained entry by the use of force.
The majority's opinion incorrectly excluded the question of
whether the school had been lawfully closed. This question has direct
bearing on whether Horelick had license or privilege to be in the
school under section 140.10. As stated in the dissenting opinion, to
the extent that confusion reigned concerning the proper exercise of
authority, it is evident that Horelick could not have possessed the
necessary mens rea or subjective factor for the offense of criminal tres-
pass. Even granting the majority's dismissal of the lawfulness of the
school's closing, Horelick could not have knowingly entered unlaw-
fully, since the law leaves it unclear whether entry under such con-
flicting mandates of authority is prohibited. Here it would seem that
the school, although declared closed by the principal, was actually open
to the appellant by the board's consent, or even by its express invita-
tion. It follows, therefore, that the hostile and frustrating opposition
of the custodians, in denying Horelick a right he thought he had,
would be ample reason for him to resort to an unusual means of
entry.
Even if Horelick had known that his entry would have constituted
an unlawful act under ordinary circumstances, and therefore had an
intent or motive to commit the trespass, the mobile4 -the profound
43. Brief for Respondent, supra note 41.
44. Instant case at 458, 285 N.E.2d at 866, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (emphasis
added).
45. The idea generated in this sentence, and the two that follow, is based on
652
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intentionality or social cause of his transgression-is to be found in
the contradictory actions of the higher school authorities and in Hore-
lick's awareness of the need to educate children in spite of an un-
justified walkout on the part of some teachers. The mobile concept
has been the unarticulated basis for decisions in some entrapment
cases.46 In these cases, the defendant is generally found not guilty even
for intentional acts when the profound cause of his act lies with the
government itself. Further, Raley v. Ohio47 and Cox v. Louisiana8
presented "unusual" situations in which the United States Supreme
Court was able to predicate its application of due process concepts
on the state's assurances of legality to the defendant. In Raley, the
appellants were brought before a state commission which was in-
vestigating activities it thought were subversive to the government.
The appellants were informed that they had right to rely on the
privilege against self-incrimination as afforded by the Ohio Constitu-
tion. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently held, however, that an
Ohio immunity statute deprived the appellants of the privilege against
self-incrimination, and therefore they actually committed an offense
by not answering the questions to which they had asserted the privi-
lege. The United States Supreme Court held that this ruling violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It concluded
that to allow such a conviction would be to sanction an indefensible
sort of entrapment by the state, even when the state had no intent
to deceive the appellants. 49
In Cox, appellant, a leader of a civil rights demonstration, was
told by the police chief of Baton Rouge that he could hold a meeting
of the group of protesters as long as it was confined to a particular side
of the street. After later deciding that the meeting was becoming in-
flammatory, the Sheriff ordered the group to disperse. When the order
was refused, tear gas was used and the appellant was eventually ar-
rested and convicted of disturbing the peace, obstructing public pass-
age and courthouse picketing. The United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that the appellant was in effect advised by the city's highest
an interview with Mitchell M. Franklin, Professor of Law, State University of New
York at Buffalo, School of Law, in Buffalo, New York, Nov. 28, 1972. For an article
which helps to lay the foundation for this concept, see Franklin, A Precis of the Ameri-
can Law of Contract for Foreign Civilians, 39 TUL. L. REv. 635, 679-86 (1965).
46. See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, THE CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
991-1004 (2d ed. 1969).
47. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
48. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
49. 360 U.S. at 437-38.
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police officials that a demonstration at the place where it was held
was ,not "near" the courthouse; thus, to permit him to be convicted
for exercising a privilege they had told him was available would be
to allow a type of entrapment violative of the due process clause. 0
The general due process standard regarding entrapment is limited
to the court's scrutiny of a state's behavior as it regulates conduct and
enforces its authority. It could easily have been applied in Horelick,
since the board of education derives its power from state law. New
York has not definitively spoken on whether one may be protected
from entrapment by state officers,5' and Horelick might have been an
appropriate situation in which to do so. The due process approach to en-
trapment would help to prevent the innocent from being convicted.
It could also objectively examine the propriety of police and state
behavior in light of accepted standards.
.Many teachers felt disdain toward the petty jealousies of the
UFT and identified strongly with what was being attempted by the
city and the board during this period. During the seesaw events of
autumn, 1968, those teachers saw the children as the only real vic-
tims of the UFT's strike and the actions of those in support of it.
Though in the midst of a power struggle and a racial dispute, these
teachers merely desired to teach-a desire fueled by the board's pub-
lic announcement.
The majority opinion may have sensed Horelick's predicament
after all: "[I]t is even sadly regrettable, that a school teacher should
suffer a penal sanction for conduct motivated by an ideology . . . 2
In these terms, it would seem imperative that the majority should
have dealt with the facts as they stood according to section 140.10.
Since the court was not willing to follow the statute, it might at least
have viewed the appellant's actions in a light most favorable to him.
Reaching back into discarded law should not be an accepted method
by which the court enforces its preference for peaceful solutions. This
sort of formalistic approach, which avoids the essence of the conflict
under consideration, disregards both law and justice. It is unlikely
that an approach which is so arbitrary can ever be justified.
VINCENT L. MORGAN
50. 379 U.S. at 571.
51. Cf. People v. Donovan, 53 Misc. 2d 687, 279 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
1967), a case in which the public authorities were estopped to prosecute the defendant
for driving a car while her ability was restricted by her consumption of alcohol after the
police had instructed her to leave private property upon which she had parked.
52. Instant case at 458, 285 N.E.2d at 866, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
